Tariff Tracker

It is Monday, March 9th, 2026, and here’s your latest Tariff Tracker:

Manufacturers are watching PM Carney return from a 10-day trade diversification trip with a new auto sector strategy in hand, the US$175B tariff refund ruling now rippling through Canadian export firms, and the CUSMA summer review emerging as the single most important near-term event for every cross-border supply chain.

The VP of Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters stated plainly that most of the current tariff noise is “just noise until those talks begin in earnest” at the CUSMA review expected this summer, with the federal government actively preparing for what will be the most consequential trade negotiation for Canadian manufacturing in a generation. The review will cover auto rules of origin, steel and aluminium content requirements, dairy access, and potentially the CUSMA annual-review mechanism that Canada has publicly warned could “chill” long-term investment.

One year into the trade war, a CBC documentary confirms that the Buy Canadian movement has become a structural commercial force, with demand for domestically sourced manufactured goods and materials rising sharply enough to prompt real sourcing shifts by large industrial buyers—a trend that is reshaping procurement strategies independently of the tariff resolution timeline.

PM Carney announced that Canada could adopt Trump’s “made-in-U.S. auto principle” through a market mechanism—a credits system for investors—rather than by mandate, signaling that Ottawa is prepared to make structural concessions on domestic auto content rules to protect cross-border trade flows. This follows Carney’s February 5 announcement of a C$3 billion auto sector fund from the Strategic Response Fund plus up to C$100 million from the Regional Tariff Response Initiative, aimed at helping manufacturers adapt, grow, and diversify to new markets.

The auto strategy also includes a C$2.3 billion EV Affordability Program that limits purchase incentives to EVs made in countries Canada has free trade agreements with—effectively excluding Chinese EVs from subsidy eligibility even as the 6.1% quota-based arrangement opens the door to their entry, a careful balancing act designed to satisfy both U.S. pressure and domestic EV manufacturing interests.

Section 232 tariffs now cover 407 downstream product categories including appliances, railcars, EV parts, wind turbines, mobile cranes, and more, with those items facing a 50% tariff on steel and aluminium content plus existing country-specific rates on other materials, affecting over US$200 billion in imports. The proclamation also introduced a new “melted and poured” / “smelted and cast” North American origin requirement for steel and aluminium, meaning that inputs processed outside the U.S., Canada, or Mexico—even if assembled in North America—face full tariff rates with no exemption pathway.

This downstream expansion is particularly damaging for equipment manufacturers, EV producers, and clean-energy suppliers whose products span multiple tariff categories: a wind turbine, for example, is now hit on its steel tower, aluminium nacelle, and EV-related components simultaneously, compounding the tariff burden in ways that earlier cost models did not anticipate.

A federal judge ruled U.S. companies that paid IEEPA-invalidated tariffs are legally entitled to refunds, extending the order to cover all importers who paid—not just those who filed formal challenges. The VP of Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters noted last week that while the Supreme Court ruling and refund order are “somewhat positive,” it “really doesn’t change too much” for most Canadian exporters, who remain in the same tariff position they were in a week ago—still facing 25% on steel and aluminium, 10% on non-CUSMA goods, and 50% on expanded metals categories.

For manufacturers with U.S. importing subsidiaries or customers who absorbed IEEPA-era costs, the ruling does create a real audit and documentation opportunity: any firm that paid tariffs under the now-invalidated IEEPA orders should immediately review payment records with trade counsel, as the refund window has opened even for passive payers who never formally protested.

Trump’s “15% tariffs for everyone” threat has, in practice, become a 10% global tariff under Section 122 as the baseline, with the administration framing 15% as an upper ceiling rather than the default rate. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and other officials have repeatedly said the White House is working on a supplemental proclamation to raise the tariff to 15% “where appropriate”, targeting specific countries or sectors after further reviews instead of imposing an automatic, across‑the‑board 15% on all imports.

For manufacturers, that means Customs is still collecting 10% on covered imports today, layered on top of existing metals and sectoral tariffs, while the 15% figure functions as a conditional threat tied to future determinations—especially for countries seen as undercutting U.S. reshoring goals or resisting Trump’s trade demands. Until a new proclamation is actually signed and published, planners are modeling scenarios where some partners or product lines move to 15% while others remain at 10%, rather than assuming a uniform jump for every supplier.

Global Affairs Canada’s January joint arrangement with China confirms that Canada will extend to the end of 2026 its tariff‑remission measures for certain Chinese steel and aluminium products that are in short supply domestically. The arrangement covers 66 lines of product‑specific remissions (11 full, 55 partial) and 49 company‑specific remissions, and will expand coverage to 7 additional steel, 2 aluminium, and 4 steel‑derivative products, with the expansion entering into force by March 1, 2026, retroactive to January 1.

For Canadian manufacturers, this provides targeted relief on specific Chinese inputs while leaving U.S.‑oriented tariff exposure unchanged: Canada’s remissions for U.S. steel used in most manufacturing expired January 31, 2026, and remissions for U.S. steel used in autos/aerospace and for aluminium run only until June 30, 2026, after which Canada’s own 25%–50% tariff structure bites fully.

U.S.–Canada tariff timeline reiterates that the U.S. still applies 25%–50% tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from Canada (expanded to 407 HS codes) and 25% tariffs on imported automobiles and parts made outside the U.S., while Canada responds with 25% tariffs on non‑CUSMA‑compliant U.S. vehicles plus C$29.8 billion in counter‑tariffs on steel, aluminium, and other goods. EDC’s 2026 outlook notes that Canada has removed most 25% tariffs on CUSMA‑compliant U.S. goods but continues to apply 25%–50% tariffs on steel and aluminium and 25% on non‑CUSMA vehicles and parts, keeping cross‑border manufacturing under sustained cost pressure.

CFIB’s SME guidance explains that, as of February 24, 2026, U.S. Customs stopped collecting the 35% IEEPA tariff on non‑CUSMA‑compliant Canadian exports and began applying the 10% global tariff, while U.S. tariffs on steel, aluminium, copper, autos, lumber, and other products remain in place under Section 232.

Reuters reports that importers seeking their share of more than US$130 billion in potential tariff refunds are flocking to the U.S. Court of International Trade, a little‑known forum that now faces one of the biggest case waves in its history. The cases center on Trump’s IEEPA‑based global tariffs that the Supreme Court struck down, with businesses ranging from industrial manufacturers to consumer‑goods importers filing challenges and “protective” refund claims.

SCOTUSblog notes that a federal appeals court has already rejected the administration’s attempt to delay the start of the refund process, clearing the way for claims to proceed even as the government argues over the scope and timing of repayments. Legal commentary stresses that manufacturers should not expect quick cash: refunds will hinge on detailed documentation and multi‑year litigation, and are being offset in the meantime by the new 10% Section 122 tariff.

The White House fact sheet confirms that Trump’s “temporary import duty” is a 10% ad valorem tariff on articles imported into the United States, effective from February 24 for 150 days under Section 122 of the Trade Act. Some imports are exempt “because of the needs of the U.S. economy,” including certain critical minerals, metals used in currency and bullion, energy, and energy products, while Canadian SME guidance clarifies that CUSMA‑compliant goods remain exempt and non‑compliant goods now face 10% instead of the prior 35% IEEPA rate.

Yale’s “State of Tariffs” analysis (from Feb. 21 2026) frames this 10% duty as a surcharge layered on top of existing sectoral regimes, emphasizing that Section 232 tariffs on steel, aluminium, autos, trucks, copper, lumber, furniture, and some semiconductors remain in force and continue to concentrate tariff burdens on metal‑intensive and automotive supply chains.

A new fact‑check and timeline review confirms that, one year into Trump’s trade war with Canada, U.S. tariffs on Canadian steel now reach 50% for most raw and semi‑processed products (with some CUSMA/USMCA exemptions), 25% on aluminium, and 25% on non‑CUSMA‑compliant vehicles and parts. Canada has responded with 25% tariffs on U.S. steel and aluminium, a separate 25% tariff on steel‑derivative products (effective December 2025), and 25% tariffs on non‑CUSMA‑compliant U.S. vehicles.

The review emphasizes that Trump has “tightened enforcement and closed exemptions” over the past year, making tariffs “more binding than they were a year ago,” while Canada’s remission framework for U.S. steel in most manufacturing uses expired January 31, 2026, with auto/aerospace steel and aluminium remissions running only until June 30, 2026.

Following Volkswagen’s successful negotiation for a tariff exemption on its China‑manufactured Cupra Tavascan SUV in exchange for a minimum price and sales quota, major Chinese automakers are now expected to approach Brussels seeking similar deals. This marks the first tariff exemption since the EU imposed additional duties of up to 20–30% on Chinese‑made EVs in 2024, and establishes a new model where tariff relief is tied to pricing floors and volume caps rather than blanket liberalization.

For North American manufacturers, this EU precedent underscores a global trend toward granular, negotiated tariff arrangements that link relief to specific commitments—similar to Canada’s auto‑import credit program and the U.S.–Taiwan chip deal—requiring manufacturers to actively engage with trade authorities rather than relying on broad tariff rollbacks.

New data released by the U.S. Senate Joint Economic Committee confirms that the U.S. manufacturing industry lost 108,000 jobs during Trump’s first year back in office (January 2025–January 2026), contradicting the administration’s claims that tariffs would bring factory employment “roaring back.” The analysis underscores that Trump’s tariff policies—including 50% tariffs on steel and aluminium, 25% tariffs on most foreign vehicles and parts, and broad country‑level duties—have not reversed long‑term structural declines in manufacturing employment.

Economists quoted in the data note that tariffs have raised costs for essential components and materials without triggering large‑scale reshoring, leaving many manufacturers squeezed between higher input costs and weak demand, and forcing them to delay hiring and investment.

In a significant rebuke, the U.S. House of Representatives rejected an attempt to block votes that would end the national emergency underpinning President Trump’s tariffs, opening the door for Congress to challenge the legal foundation of his sweeping trade measures. The vote clears the way for legislative action that could terminate the emergency declarations Trump has used to impose tariffs under IEEPA and other executive authorities, though any such resolution would still need to pass the Senate and survive a presidential veto.

For manufacturers, this signals growing bipartisan frustration with tariffs in Congress, but legal and trade analysts caution that even if both chambers pass a resolution, the threshold for overriding a Trump veto is very high, meaning that tariffs are likely to remain in place through at least 2026–27 regardless of Congressional action.

The planned Big Tech carve‑out underscores that Trump’s semiconductor‑tariff strategy is evolving from the narrow “advanced computing chips” list hit on January 15 to a broader framework that will impose 25% or higher tariffs on many chips and semiconductor equipment, while exempting firms that make large U.S. investments or serve critical data‑center needs. For manufacturers, this means that the April 14 and July 1, 2026 review dates set in the January proclamation are likely to trigger significant new tariff lines, with exemption eligibility determined by investment commitments and strategic importance rather than blanket relief.

Trade‑law guidance continues to stress that manufacturers should not assume a quick rollback of tariffs even if the Supreme Court limits presidential authority, as the administration has multiple legal tools and can shift tariffs from IEEPA to Section 232 or other statutes if needed.

Canada’s trade deal with China extended its tariff‑remission program for Chinese steel and aluminium products in short supply domestically through the end of 2026, covering 66 product‑specific lines and 49 company‑specific lines, with additions effective March 1, 2026 and retroactive relief to January 1. This targeted relief provides a bridge for Canadian manufacturers facing supply constraints, but does not replace the broader cost increases from expired U.S.‑steel remissions and Canada’s own 25% steel‑derivative tariffs and tighter TRQs.

Trade advisers stress that Canadian manufacturers must map exposure to multiple overlapping tariff regimes—U.S. Section 232 on steel/aluminium content, Canada’s counter‑tariffs and steel‑derivative measures, China‑specific remissions, and CUSMA/USMCA rules—to understand true landed costs and tariff‑relief options.

The House vote to allow challenges to Trump’s tariff emergency represents the first significant Congressional pushback against the administration’s use of executive authority to impose tariffs, but legal analysts stress that manufacturers should not expect quick relief: even if both chambers pass a resolution, Trump is almost certain to veto it, and Congress is unlikely to muster the two‑thirds vote needed to override. At the same time, the pending Supreme Court IEEPA case could invalidate some tariffs and trigger US$133–135 billion in refunds, but that outcome remains uncertain and would take months or years to fully implement.

Manufacturers are being told to continue planning around high, multi‑layered tariffs as a structural feature of the 2026–27 environment, using Congressional and judicial developments as potential upside scenarios rather than base‑case assumptions.

Canadian law and policy summaries continue to stress that, as of December 26, 2025, Canada applies a 25% global tariff on specified steel‑derivative imports—including refrigerators, washing machines, dryers, doors, windows, structural components, wire, nails, fasteners, shelving, springs, and chains—and has reduced steel tariff‑rate quotas to 20% of 2024 volumes for non‑FTA partners and 75% for non‑CUSMA FTA partners. Ottawa’s remission schedule for U.S. steel used in most manufacturing expired January 31, 2026, while remissions for steel used in autos/aerospace and for aluminium run only until June 30, 2026.

Federal Reserve Governor Stephen Miran stated over the weekend that data suggest Americans are not shouldering the tariff hit, arguing that Trump‑era tariffs have had a “muted economic impact” and that foreign exporters have absorbed more of the cost than commonly thought. However, this view conflicts with widespread economic research showing that tariffs on Chinese imports were almost fully passed through to U.S. import prices and that manufacturers importing affected goods have faced immediate cost increases, margin compression, and reduced capital investment.

Analysts note that the debate over “who pays” is less relevant for manufacturers than the operational reality: tariffs have raised landed costs for steel, aluminium, electronics, and machinery, forcing companies to either absorb those costs (reducing margins and investment) or pass them on to customers (reducing demand), with overall manufacturing employment down 72,000 jobs since April 2025.

Fresh analysis shows Trump’s tariff policies cost each American household an average of US$1,000 last year, driven by higher prices on imported goods and the pass‑through of tariff costs along supply chains, and are on track to cost households another US$1,000 in 2026 if the current tariff structure remains unchanged. The research emphasizes that while some costs have been absorbed by foreign exporters or by U.S. businesses squeezing margins, the bulk of the burden has landed on American consumers and manufacturers that rely on imported components.

This aligns with CFO‑focused guidance showing effective tariff rates at 10.1% in 2026, the highest since 1946, with manufacturers importing US$10 million in components annually facing roughly US$1 million in additional tariff costs before any mitigation strategies.

Trump threatened Monday night to block the opening of the US$4.7‑billion Gordie Howe International Bridge connecting Windsor and Detroit unless the U.S. is “fully compensated for everything we have given” Canada and owns “at least one half” of the structure. In a Truth Social post, Trump claimed Canada owns both ends of the bridge, built it with “virtually no U.S. content” thanks to an Obama‑era Buy American waiver, and expects to “take advantage of America,” adding that U.S. revenues from the bridge would be “astronomical.”

Prime Minister Carney said Tuesday he spoke with Trump and told him Canada paid the full US$6.4‑billion construction cost and that the bridge is jointly owned by Canada and the state of Michigan, with steel and workers from both countries, calling it “a great example of collaboration” and expressing optimism that “the situation will be resolved.” The bridge, which handles about a third of all U.S.–Canada trade, is complete and set to open this year, and analysts warn that blocking it would raise costs for automakers and other manufacturers that depend on the Windsor–Detroit corridor for just‑in‑time delivery of parts and finished goods.

The Trump regime plans to spare firms such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft from upcoming tariffs on chips, creating a “Big Tech carve‑out” as it prepares to widen semiconductor tariffs beyond the narrow “advanced computing chips” hit with 25% duties on January 15. The Financial Times reports that the administration is designing the next round of chip tariffs to target firms that do not contribute meaningfully to U.S. data‑center or fab capacity, while granting relief to major cloud and AI providers that are investing heavily in domestic infrastructure.

For electronics and industrial manufacturers that buy chips for products like servers, networking gear, industrial controls, and automotive systems, this signals that the April and July 2026 review dates could bring significantly broader chip and semiconductor‑equipment tariffs, with exemptions limited to a handful of large tech firms and fab investors.

The U.S. and Taiwan have finalized a trade agreement that cuts U.S. tariffs on many Taiwanese exports to a cap of about 15% and includes tariff exemptions or preferential rates for key sectors such as semiconductors, autos, wood furniture, and some aerospace components. In return, Taiwanese chipmakers have committed around US$250 billion in U.S. investments, with a focus on large fabrication clusters in Arizona and other states, backed by Taiwanese credit guarantees and U.S. industrial‑park support.

Commerce officials describe the pact as a “groundbreaking” step to reshore semiconductor production, saying Taiwanese semiconductor firms investing in U.S. fabs will qualify for favorable tariff treatment and exemptions that reduce or neutralize some of Trump’s broader 25% semiconductor levies for qualifying plants.

As US-EU trade tensions rise, the European Commission is preparing a targeted tariff package against US-manufactured cars and machinery. Brussels indicated the measures could go into effect by mid-August if the US follows through with new tech-sector tariffs. The EU plans to impose duties of up to 25%, which would significantly impact American exporters .

Trump threatened “substantial” new tariffs and semiconductor export restrictions against countries imposing digital services taxes on US tech firms. The warning targets policies that “discriminate against American technology” while giving “a complete pass to China’s largest tech companies.” The threat covers advanced technology and chip exports.

The US has expanded Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs to include hundreds of additional products, specifically targeting Canadian auto parts that were previously exempt under CUSMA. This represents a “workaround” to tariff more Canadian goods while maintaining the appearance of honoring the trade agreement. Canada has responded by implementing a 25% surtax on Chinese steel and aluminum to prevent dumping, while retaining retaliatory tariffs on US steel, aluminum, and autos.

While Canada’s manufacturing sector lost 29,400 jobs in Q2 2025 (a 3.5% decline), the S&P Global Canada Manufacturing PMI improved to 48.3 in August from 46.1 in July, indicating slower contraction. Export orders climbed to 44.8 from 41.9, suggesting reduced uncertainty around tariff impacts. However, Ontario unemployment in manufacturing-heavy Windsor surged to 11.2%, and 44% of manufacturers have delayed investments.

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled 7-4 on Friday that President Trump exceeded his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose global tariffs. The court determined that only Congress has the constitutional power to levy taxes, including tariffs. However, the tariffs remain in effect until October 14 to allow for a Supreme Court appeal. The ruling affects the majority of Trump’s tariffs imposed on Canada, Mexico, China, and nearly 60 other countries.

Trump’s September 5 executive order granting tariff exemptions to “aligned partners” with reciprocal trade agreements officially takes effect at 12:01 AM EDT. Over 45 categories of goods now qualify for zero import tariffs, including nickel (essential for EV batteries and stainless steel), gold in all forms, pharmaceutical compounds like lidocaine, chemicals, graphite, neodymium magnets, and LED lightbulbs. The exemptions apply to products the US “cannot produce domestically or in sufficient quantities” and align with existing agreements with Japan and the EU.

While Canada eliminated most retaliatory tariffs on September 1, duties remain on US steel, aluminum, and automobiles. The remaining tariffs cover just 313 HS product codes, down from over 1,000 previously. Canadian officials indicate these sectors will retain protection until broader trade negotiations conclude.

US container imports increased significantly in August as businesses rushed to stockpile goods ahead of the October 14 Supreme Court deadline on tariff legality. Import volumes rose despite higher costs, with companies frontloading inventory to avoid potential disruptions. However, industry analysts warn the year-end outlook remains dim due to ongoing tariff uncertainty and elevated trade tensions.

US wholesale prices unexpectedly declined 0.1% in August, cooling from July’s sharp increase despite widespread tariff implementation. The producer price index drop suggests tariff costs may not be passing through to wholesale markets as quickly as anticipated, though economists warn this could reflect inventory drawdowns and temporary effects rather than sustained trends.

A new survey of 254 US companies operating in China found nearly two-thirds report reduced expected revenues for their China operations in 2025 due to Trump’s tariffs. The American Chamber of Commerce in China survey highlights how the 30% tariff rate (extended until November 10) is hurting American businesses’ ability to compete in the world’s second-largest economy. Companies face the dual challenge of higher export costs and Chinese retaliatory measures.

The Bank of Canada reduced its key policy rate by 0.5 percentage points to 2.5% Wednesday, citing risks to the economy from US tariffs and trade policy uncertainty. Bank Governor Tiff Macklem stated: “The Canadian economy is being affected by both US tariffs and the unpredictability of US trade policy. GDP declined by 1.6% in the second quarter.” The bank noted manufacturing job losses and business investment delays as key concerns.

Fortune analysis reveals small businesses face average annual costs of $856,000 from tariff policy changes, with only 37% having access to credit to weather the volatility. Eight major tariff adjustments in 12 months have created “policy whiplash” that large corporations can navigate but devastates smaller importers. When Trump eliminated de minimis exemptions, 4 million daily packages lost duty-free status—affecting 92% of all cargo and representing 97% of US importers.

Major retailers are employing sophisticated “tariff arbitrage” strategies using wholesale middlemen and complex supply chain routing to minimize tariff impacts on consumer prices. From luxury goods to mass-market items, distributors are finding creative ways to get consumers closer to wholesale prices despite the 20%+ average US tariff environment. The strategies involve strategic inventory placement, country-of-origin optimization, and alternative shipping routes.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum concluded their Mexico City summit with agreements to boost bilateral trade and coordinate responses to US tariff pressures. Both countries are increasing trade with each other as alternatives to US markets, with Carney stating Canada’s “old relationship” with the US is “over.” The leaders pledged closer coordination during upcoming USMCA renegotiations and joint strategies for dealing with Trump’s trade policies.

Latest analysis shows small manufacturers pay about $856,000 in extra annual tariff and compliance costs, with rapid “policy whiplash” from 8 changes in the past year. Only 37% of these firms have the credit access to weather ongoing volatility, driving many to reduce headcount, cancel investment, or consolidate.

A new Outokumpu survey of 70 top industrial buyers (combined $430B in annual revenue) finds one in three have paused or delayed stainless steel orders due to global tariff rounds and trade tension, with over half reevaluating suppliers. Automotive, construction, energy, and infrastructure projects are hardest hit, as procurement is forced to diversify and adapt to the unpredictable pricing environment.

Canada removed 25% tariffs on most US goods under CUSMA as of September 1, but US duties on Canadian steel, aluminum, copper, and auto parts are expanding. US Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs (now 50% on hundreds more products) are deeply hitting Canadian transformers, railcars, wires, and clean energy equipment. Canada still maintains retaliatory tariffs on US steel, aluminum, and autos, applying pressure as 2026 CUSMA talks approach.

Roland Berger analysis shows US imports from China fell by half between January and May 2025, with electronics and industrial machinery dropping over 60% in June compared to January. This decline preceded the April reciprocal tariff regime, as importers scaled back orders anticipating further increases. Meanwhile, shipments from Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Mexico have spiked as companies preemptively diversify away from China.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) warned Tuesday that while global growth remains more resilient than expected, the complete impact of the US import tariff shock has yet to be realized. The effective US tariff rate on merchandise imports reached approximately 19.5% by the end of August—the highest level since 1933 during the Great Depression. Companies have largely absorbed the shock by reducing profit margins and depleting inventory stockpiles accumulated before tariff announcements. “The comprehensive effects will become evident as companies exhaust inventories and elevated tariff rates continue enforcement,” stated OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann.

Construction companies report that essential building materials—steel, aluminum, lumber, copper, and stone—now face tariffs ranging from 10% to 50%, creating unprecedented cost pressures. GI Stone’s CEO called potential 25% tariffs “lethal” for her North Side Chicago manufacturing facility, which transforms imported stone into high-end countertops. The effective US tariff rate has reached 17.4%, the highest since 1935, forcing developers to delay projects and absorb significant cost increases.

Effective September 1, Canada eliminated 25% retaliatory tariffs on CUSMA-compliant US goods, maintaining duties only on steel, aluminum, and automobiles. The move reduces Canadian tariffs from over 1,000 product codes to just 313 HS classifications. Prime Minister Mark Carney framed the decision as advancing trade talks ahead of 2026 CUSMA renegotiations, though critics argue it represents capitulation to US pressure.

The Trump administration issued formal notice Wednesday implementing the US-European Union trade agreement, confirming that auto and auto parts imports will face 15% duties retroactively from August 1. The deal exempts certain pharmaceutical compounds, all aircraft and aircraft parts, and specific natural resources. European automakers can request refunds for excess duties paid above the 15% cap since August. The agreement represents Trump’s preference for bilateral deals over multilateral frameworks.

The S&P Global Flash US Manufacturing PMI fell to 52.0 in September from 53.0 in August, marking the second consecutive month of deceleration. The slowdown reflects “supply chain disruptions and higher costs tied to Trump-era tariffs,” with new orders and output growth weakening significantly. Export demand softened as global buyers react to US trade policies, while domestic manufacturers face rising raw material prices. Despite high inventories, continued tariff pressure is expected to limit expansion in coming months.

China has not purchased any US soybeans since May, instead pivoting to massive orders from Brazil and Argentina as the trade war escalates. US soybean export value had previously plunged from $14 billion in 2016 to $3.1 billion in 2018 during Trump’s first term, and farmers now face a similar scenario. The American Soybean Association warns of “panic” among producers as their largest market remains closed.

The Trump administration confirmed that tariff probes and collections will continue even in the event of a government shutdown, with Customs and Border Protection operations funded as essential services. Investigations remain underway into medical equipment, robotics, and additional manufacturing sectors—signaling more potential hikes ahead.

Trump reiterated his plan to enforce a 100% duty on all movies “made outside the United States,” targeting international productions distributed within US borders. The move caused share prices for Netflix and Warner Bros. to drop. The impact is expected to be severe for foreign studios and US streaming services relying on global content, potentially reshaping production and distribution strategies.

On Monday, Trump signed a proclamation imposing a 10% tariff on all imported timber and softwood lumber and a 25% tariff on kitchen cabinets, vanities, and upholstered furniture, starting October 14. Crucially, these tariffs will rise even further on January 1, 2026, to 30% on upholstered wooden products and 50% on cabinets and vanities for countries that do not strike an agreement with the US. Canada, the leading exporter of wood to the US, is expected to be severely impacted, as it already faces total tariffs exceeding 35%. Builders and renovators have warned these moves may discourage investment in new construction and raise housing costs.

With US tariffs causing widespread impact, countries from Canada to the EU and Asia are ramping up new free trade agreements, seeking to offset export losses and diversify away from American demand. The ripple effects continue to disrupt established international trade routes.

Consumer prices for housing, renovations, and furniture are expected to jump. US and global firms warn of possible supply shortages, longer wait times, and project delays, with small manufacturers and builders facing the greatest risk to their margins and viability as tariffs ratchet up.

Trump’s renewed threat of a 100% tariff on movies made outside the US sparked fierce debate across Hollywood and global production hubs, especially in Canada and Europe. The policy’s enforceability and the scope of what constitutes a “foreign-made” movie remain unclear, but studios are bracing for contract renegotiations and higher consumer costs.

Heavy tariffs on timber, cabinets, vanities, and furniture are expected to push new home and renovation costs higher across the US, with experts warning the moves could worsen the country’s ongoing housing crisis. Construction leaders say tariffs undermine the effects of recent Fed interest rate cuts meant to improve housing affordability.

A 25% tariff on imported medium and heavy-duty trucks is now in effect. While the White House says EU, Japan, and UK deals cap their exposure at 15% for pharma and trucks, these caps reportedly don’t extend to furniture. Canada and Mexico, both major suppliers under USMCA, face more complex compliance challenges. US truck and truck part manufacturers warn of supply chain bottlenecks as tariff stacking rules (to avoid compounding steel, aluminum, and country-of-origin duties) remain convoluted.

Wood manufacturing clusters in Ontario are reporting “anxiety and immediate threat of layoffs” as 10–50% duties on lumber, cabinets, and furniture put export competitiveness in jeopardy. New US rules on tariff stacking and origin compliance add to the complexity for Canadian exporters.

With supply chain and input cost shocks building, holiday shopping season 2025 is expected to see higher inflation and weaker sales, particularly in hard-hit furniture and electronics. Smaller importers and manufacturers are most vulnerable, as tariffs are passed down lines, crowding out margins and threatening layoffs during the critical peak period.

Trump’s 100% tariff on branded/patented pharmaceutical imports took effect October 1, unless companies are building U.S. manufacturing plants. This represents a major shift in drug pricing policy with companies scrambling to announce U.S. facility construction to avoid the tariff.

Saskatchewan exports to China have “drastically fallen” amid Ottawa’s 100% electric vehicle tariff dispute with Beijing. China was Saskatchewan’s second-largest export market, receiving nearly $4 billion in agricultural products last year, but trade has collapsed as the tariff dispute escalates.

Canadian Privy Council Clerk Michael Sabia and chief trade negotiator Kirsten Hillman resumed high-level talks in Washington with US Commerce Secretary Lutnick and Trade Representative Greer. Canada is focusing on removing Section 232 tariffs on steel (50%), aluminum (50%), autos (25%), and now lumber (10% new, totaling 45% with existing duties). Provincial unity is fracturing as economic pressure mounts.

The White House has extended the US “production offset credit” to 2030 for autos, lowering the effective parts tariff rate (previously set to halve by 2027 and end in 2028). November 1 begins a 25% tariff on all imported medium/heavy trucks and related parts, and a 10% tariff on buses/motorcoaches—with CUSMA (formerly USMCA) countries partially exempt for compliant vehicles. Automakers spent $10 billion in extra tariff costs on cross-border trade this year, prompting more US-based assembly and North American sourcing. After lobbying, Canada and Mexico won limited exemptions.

Starting November 1, nearly all imported medium and heavy-duty vehicles and related parts will face a 25% duty; imported buses will be hit with a 10% rate. USMCA-qualified vehicles can mitigate some costs, but stricter compliance checks and new “privileged foreign status” rules in US Foreign Trade Zones are increasing paperwork and audit risk for manufacturers. Vehicles and buses over 25 years old are exempt.

Algoma Steel in Sault Ste. Marie has issued about 1,000 temporary layoff notices, explicitly citing reduced demand and competitive pressure linked to U.S. steel tariffs and global oversupply. The company points to the combined effect of 50% U.S. tariffs on Canadian steel, soft prices, and customer uncertainty as key reasons for cutting shifts and output. Regional leaders warn that the layoffs underscore how deeply U.S. tariff policy is reverberating through Canadian heavy industry and local manufacturing ecosystems.